TAMPA, August 22, 2012 – As we approach the Republican and Democratic National Conventions with two major party candidates that don’t substantively disagree on anything, debate about the causes of the housing bubble and what should be done about it will inevitably recur.
Both candidates advocate massive government intervention. They just disagree about the details.
Neil Barofsky weighs in with the generally accepted argument that the repeal of Glass-Steagall was the creator of what he calls “the monster,” highly leveraged investment banks taking extraordinary risks that led to the 2008 financial meltdown.
Barofsky is right about Wall Street being a monster, but the repeal of Glass Steagall wasn’t its Frankenstein. As Tom Woods explains in his bestseller, Rollback,
“But did the repeal of two provisions of Glass-Steagall allowing affiliation of commercial banks with securities firms through their control by the same holding company contribute to the losses and risk that permeated the system? Certainly not. For one thing, commercial banks bought mortgage-backed securities for their AAA rating, their attractive return, and the minimal capital requirements associated with holding them; they did not acquire these assets because they were connected to investment banks that were trying to unload them.
Moreover, severe regulatory firewalls essentially prevent this kind of affiliation from contributing to losses or increased risk on the part of the commercial bank involved. The reverse problem, that affiliation with a commercial bank might bring down and investment bank, is exceedingly unlikely, given the relative magnitudes of assets held by each institution. The commercial banks’ assets were only a tiny fraction of those held by the investment banks they were affiliated with. These banks were in no position to cause the investment banks any serious problem, much less their complete downfall.”
If that’s true, then why was that “sucker going down,” as President Bush so eloquently put it?